• K9 artillery guns from Battery Piraya in the Artillery Battalion, Brigade Nord, stand gathered under the Northern Lights in the Setermoen training area during an exercise in September 2022. (Image: Image: Forsvaret.no)

Norway’s Defence Surge: High North Tensions

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Norway is undertaking a once-in-a-generation military modernisation. It is also strongly supporting Ukraine in its war against Russia. The hybrid warfare is increasingly probing the Nordic region – from drone disturbances at airports and undersea cable sabotage to relentless GPS jamming – forcing Norway and its neighbours to reassess their defences.

Against Russian pressure, Oslo has responded with unprecedented defence investments at home and robust military aid abroad. The Norwegian government has declared that the country faces its most serious security situation since World War II, prompting a sharp boost in defence spending and a commitment to help Ukraine blunt Russian aggression.

Unprecedented Defence Spending

F-18 and F-35 – Four American F-18s and three Norwegian F-35s in formation over Ørland Air Station. (Image: Forsvaret.no)

In April 2024, Norway’s Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre’s government unveiled a Long-Term Defence Plan (LTDP) that will inject an extra NOK 600 billion, €51 billion, into defence over 12 years, nearly doubling the annual budget by 2036. If fully implemented, Norway’s defence spending would rise from roughly NOK 100 billion in 2024 – about 1.6% of GDP – to well above NOK 200 billion by 2036. Norway reached NATO’s 2% of GDP spending benchmark in 2024 – two years ahead of schedule – and aims to hit 2.7% of GDP by 2030, one of the highest levels in the Alliance. This rapid ramp-up is enabled in part by Norway’s booming oil and gas revenues, allowing investment in security without gutting other public services.

The new plan will strengthen all branches of Norway’s Armed Forces with more personnel and modern equipment. Støre called it Norway’s most “ambitious and far-reaching” defence plan ever. The Army, Navy and Air Force are all slated for major upgrades to address critical gaps identified in recent analyses. A 2023 official defence review bluntly concluded that Norway’s military was “not good enough” for a conflict with a peer adversary, citing serious deficiencies in air defence, anti-submarine warfare, surveillance and logistics – especially in responding to threats in the far north. The LTDP directly tackles these shortfalls. Defence Minister Bjørn Arild Gram noted the plan must address today’s weaknesses even as it expands the force for the future. Major procurement programmes are being accelerated or expanded. Norway is continuing its purchase of F-35A Lightning II stealth fighters, replacing its retired F-16s, and new P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, big-ticket American-made systems that are already boosting Norway’s capabilities in the air and at sea. In 2023 Norway decided to buy 54 new Leopard 2A7 main battle tanks from Germany, with an option for 18 more, to replace its ageing Leopard 2A4 fleet by 2031.

The Norwegian Army is set to acquire and operate Patria’s 6×6 armoured vehicle after Norway and the United Kingdom joined the multinational Common Armoured Vehicle System (CAVS) programme in September 2025. Patria Oyj is owned by the State of Finland (50.1%) and by Norwegian Kongsberg Defence and Aerospace AS (49.9%).

New Frigate T26 – Computer-generated images of the Type T26 Global Combat Ship with the Norwegian flag. (Image: Forsvaret.no)

Dramatic Growth in Air and Missile Defence

The Navy is set to receive at least five new submarines under a joint program with Germany, the Type 212CD class, and five to six new frigates equipped for anti-submarine warfare. Additionally, up to 28 new patrol and support vessels will be acquired, in a standardised class of up to 10 large and 18 smaller vessels, to modernise the fleet.

Perhaps the most dramatic growth will be in air and missile defence. Norway plans to field its first-ever long-range air defence system to counter threats like ballistic missiles. It will also double the number of NASAMS medium-range air defence batteries, upgrading them to better defeat drones and cruise missiles. Both the Air Force and Army will receive more air defence units, finally remedying an underdeveloped area of Norway’s defence.

On the ground, the Army is expanding from one brigade to three. New brigades will be established in the far north, in the Finnmark and Troms counties, in addition to the existing Brigade Nord, and a new Brigade South will be formed. These formations will be equipped with enhanced firepower (including long-range precision artillery), new armoured vehicles, organic air defences, and additional helicopters for mobility and special forces support. The Army’s growth goes hand-in-hand with a buildup of the Home Guard – a reservist force crucial for local defence and rapid mobilisation. The Home Guard will increase from about 40,000 to 45,000 soldiers, with more training and better equipment, reversing years of decline. By 2025 the government had already begun adding hundreds of troops and improving infrastructure in Northern Norway, such as expanding garrisons at Porsanger and Bardufoss in the Arctic region.

More Active-duty Troops

• The Home Guard’s rapid reaction force Archery from HV 11 on Jan Mayen during allied activity. Image: Forsvaret.no
The Home Guard’s rapid reaction force Archery from HV 11 on Jan Mayen during allied activity. (Image: Forsvaret.no)

To achieve goals, set in the Long-Term Defence Plan, manpower and readiness are being boosted across the board. The plan calls for adding over 20,000 personnel to the armed forces – around 4,600 more active-duty troops, including more conscripts, 13,700 more reservists, and 4,600 additional civilian staff by 2036. This roughly 20% increase in force size will provide the human capital to operate new equipment and sustain higher readiness levels. Stockpiles of munitions and spare parts are also receiving major investments, after years of undersupply. Gram warned that Norway must not end up with “an imbalanced force structure, where vessels are docked and aircraft are parked” due to lack of crew or maintenance. Thus, the government is funding infrastructure, training and logistics in parallel with buying hardware. The defence minister emphasised that Norway’s forces need to be focused on active conflict prevention every day while remaining prepared for high-intensity war – a significant shift from the minimal peacetime presence of the past.

Notably, much of this spending will benefit Norwegian industry as well as foreign suppliers. Officials stress that big defence projects should create jobs and tech development at home. For example, Kongsberg Defence co-produces the NASAMS air defence system and Naval Strike Missiles, which will see expanded orders. Likewise, the army’s new Mobile Ground Based Air Defence system, recently delivered NASAMS-derivatives, and future long-range SAMs may involve domestic participation. The government recognises that pouring billions into defence can stimulate innovation and regional development in Norway, a point repeatedly made when justifying the costs.

Norway is undertaking a once-in-a-generation military modernisation. After decades of relatively modest defence outlays, the combination of Russia’s aggression and Norway’s own economic strength has led to a political consensus on bolstering security. The LTDP has cross-party backing in Parliament, aiming for a broad political settlement so that these investments persist beyond the current government. If fully realised, Norway will field larger and far better-equipped forces by the early 2030s – a direct response to the more threatening and unpredictable environment in Northern Europe.

Massive Support to Ukraine

ROLE 1 infirmary in Camp Jomsborg as part of Operation Legio in eastern Poland. (Image: Forsvaret.no)

While strengthening its own defences, Norway has also emerged as one of Europe’s most generous supporters of Ukraine. As an energy-rich nation that profited from high gas prices since 2022, Norway faced pressure to “share the windfall” and help Ukraine resist Russia’s invasion. Oslo has answered with a multi-year aid commitment on a scale few other countries can match. In February 2023, Norway created the Nansen Support Programme for Ukraine, initially pledging NOK 75 billion, €6.4 billion, in aid over five years (2023–2027) split between military and civilian purposes. By 2024–25, this was significantly increased. In fact, for 2025 Norway doubled its planned Ukraine assistance to 85 billion NOK, €7.3 billion, in response to growing needs and waning U.S. support. The Prime Minister noted this was “the only right thing to do” given Norway’s record oil revenues and the grave stakes of the war. The aid package – roughly 1% of Norway’s GDP in a single year – underscores that Norway is now one of the world’s largest donors to Ukraine on a per-capita basis.

Norway’s aid includes not just financial grants but also substantial military equipment. Norwegian officials emphasise that helping arm Ukraine bolsters European security, including Norway’s own, by tying down Russia’s offensive capacity. Norway has provided over €2 billion worth of military hardware and humanitarian aid to Ukraine since 2022. In 2023 alone, it gave around €1 billion in military aid under the Nansen program, including advanced weaponry such as NASAMS air defence systems. The transfer of NASAMS firing units, jointly produced by Norway’s Kongsberg and Raytheon, was confirmed in early 2023, adding to Ukraine’s layered air defences.

Norway has also supplied Ukraine with heavy weapons that significantly boost Ukrainian firepower:

  • Main Battle Tanks: In March 2023, Norway delivered eight Leopard 2A4 tanks along with four specialised support vehicles to Ukraine. Norwegian instructors helped train Ukrainian crews in Poland as part of the European tank coalition. Oslo also financed spare parts and ammunition for these tanks. The donation was part of a joint effort with other countries to equip at least two Ukrainian tank battalions with Leopards. As Defence Minister Gram said, it is vital for Norway’s and Europe’s security that “Russia does not win with its aggression against Ukraine” – hence the decision to part with nearly a quarter of Norway’s operational tank fleet. (Norway is concurrently buying new Leopards for itself, as noted above.)
  • F-16 Fighter Jets: Norway has decided to donate F-16 fighter aircraft from its retired fleet, following the lead of the Netherlands and Denmark. In mid-2024, Prime Minister Støre announced that Norway would transfer six F-16s to Ukraine, with deliveries expected to begin in 2024. These American-built jets, though older, will significantly enhance Ukraine’s air capabilities once Ukrainian pilots are trained. Norway phased out its F-16s in 2021 after over 40 years of service, replacing them with F-35s. Rather than mothball all the old planes or sell them off, Norway is sending a portion to Ukraine – a move politically unthinkable before 2022 but now part of a broader Western effort to strengthen Ukraine’s Air Force. An arms transfer report suggests Norway may have quietly provided more than six F-16s – possibly up to 14 – although officially only six are confirmed so far. In addition to planes, Norway contributed NOK 1.3 billion, €111 million, in late 2024 to support Ukrainian air defence and fighter operations, such as pilot training and anti-drone measures.
  • Artillery and Rockets: Early in the war, Norway supplied Ukraine with M109 155mm self-propelled howitzers from its surplus stocks, as well as tens of thousands of artillery shells. Norway had modernised its artillery to K9 Thunder SPGs, freeing older M109A3GN guns for donation. It also joined a multinational project led by the UK to provide Ukraine with MLRS rocket ammunition. In 2023–24, Norway delivered artillery ammunition and spare parts valued at over €100 million, filling urgent needs until Western production ramps up. This included a “limited, but critical” number of 155mm HE shells during the winter of 2022–23. Sustaining Ukraine’s high usage of artillery has been a priority for Norway’s assistance.
  • Anti-Tank and Anti-Air Weapons: At the outset of the invasion, Norway rushed 5,000 M72 LAW anti-tank weapons to Ukraine’s defenders. These single-use light anti-tank rockets, an early Cold War-era design still effective against lighter armoured vehicles, were among the first arms Norway provided in 2022. Norway also donated some Mistral short-range anti-air missiles from its Navy stocks in the spring of 2022, which Ukraine used to shoot down low-flying threats. Furthermore, Oslo has contributed anti-tank mines and other munitions via an Anglo-Norwegian fund in 2025, as well as night vision gear, body armour and small arms through various packages.
  • Other Vehicles and Systems: Norway gave Ukraine a Nasams air defence battery, and in 2022 it teamed with the UK to supply micro-drones. Up to 300 Black Hornet nano-drones – tiny reconnaissance UAVs developed in Norway – were purchased for Ukraine at a cost of NOK 90 million, allowing Ukrainian units to scout enemy positions at the platoon level. Norway has also sent armoured demining vehicles, three machines based on the Leopard 1 chassis for clearing mines, to help Ukrainian sappers clear minefields. In the naval domain, Norway contributed an undersea drone and a mine hunter to help Ukraine counter mines in coastal waters. To bolster maintenance, Norway is funding a tank maintenance centre in Poland with about €13.7 million to keep donated Leopards operational.
  • Training and Support: In addition to hardware, Norway has offered training for Ukrainian troops. Norwegian instructors have participated in UK-led training of Ukrainian soldiers, Operation Interflex, and in Lithuania’s training programs for engineering and bomb disposal units. Norway also joined a British initiative to establish a fund for military aid, including equipment procurement and training. In April 2025, Norway and the UK agreed a joint £450 million package for Ukraine that included maintenance of donated equipment, new counter-drone radar systems, and stockpiles of anti-tank weapons and drones for Ukraine’s future use.
Royal Maintenance. The 5th Guard Company, supported by the Norwegian Armed Forces’ Logistics Organisation, carries out maintenance of the unit’s equipment (Image: Forsvaret.no)

Norwegian officials stress that this is about “securing the lives of our own citizens” by helping Ukraine fight Russia there, so Norway need not fight Russia closer to home. It is a stark reversal from Norway’s traditionally more cautious security policy. During the Cold War and even after 2014, Norway often trod carefully to avoid provoking Moscow – for instance, restricting foreign NATO exercises in Norway and limiting its own deployments in NATO’s east. But since 2022, a broad political consensus in Norway sees robust aid to Ukraine as both morally right and strategically necessary. Even traditionally neutralist voices have largely agreed that “Ukraine must not lose” – and Norway’s wallet and weapons are open to ensure that.

High North Provocations by Russia

Norway shares a 198-km land border with Russia in the Arctic, and its northern regions near Russia’s strategic Kola Peninsula – home to the Russian Northern Fleet’s nuclear submarines and air bases. While a direct Russian military attack on Norway is considered unlikely as long as NATO stands firm, Moscow has been actively testing Norway’s defences and resolve through hybrid and indirect provocations. Over the past few years, these incidents have multiplied, creating a persistent low-grade threat in the High North. Norwegian authorities have had to respond with increased vigilance, countermeasures, and closer allied coordination.

One notable category of provocation has been sabotaging or interference with critical infrastructure:

  • In January 2022, just weeks before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, an undersea fibre-optic cable linking mainland Norway to the Svalbard archipelago was mysteriously severed. The Svalbard cable incident cut data communications to the remote Arctic islands; suspicion fell on nearby Russian vessels, e.g. “research” trawlers, that were present in the area. This foreshadowed a pattern of undersea infrastructure disruptions. Since 2022, at least eleven incidents of undersea cable cuts have been recorded around the Nordic-Baltic region. In October 2023, an explosion ruptured the Baltic Connector gas pipeline between Finland and Estonia, which Finnish investigators concluded was likely Russian sabotage in retribution for Finland joining NATO. These covert attacks exploit the vastness of undersea networks and the difficulty of attribution.
  • In late 2023 and into 2024, attention turned to suspicious activities of commercial vessels linked to Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet.” For example, in January 2025 Norwegian authorities seized a ship with an all-Russian crew, the “Silver Dania,” in Tromsø at the request of Latvia. It was suspected of involvement in damaging a subsea telecom cable between Sweden and Latvia a few days prior – part of the same incident where a Russian-linked vessel allegedly dragged anchor and tore the cable. Although Swedish investigators later attributed the cable break to a different ship, the episode put the Baltic Sea region on high alert after a string of unexplained power cable, internet cable, and pipeline outages since 2022. NATO even reinforced its presence in the area with minesweepers, maritime patrol aircraft and drones to deter further sabotage. For Norway, assisting in the detention and investigation of the Russian-crewed ship signalled a more proactive stance in policing these grey-zone threats. The ship was eventually released, but the case showed how civilian vessels can be repurposed for espionage or sabotage under deniable cover.
  • Another eyebrow-raising case was the MV Ruby in late 2024 – a Maltese-flagged cargo ship carrying 20,000 tonnes of Russian-origin ammonium nitrate, a highly explosive fertiliser ingredient, infamously known from the Beirut blast. The Ruby reported damage during a storm off northern Norway and requested refuge. Norwegian authorities allowed it into Tromsø harbour, where it docked uncomfortably close to the city and a major hospital. The incident raised alarms due to the sheer explosive potential of the cargo, 7 times the amount that levelled Beirut’s port, and the possibility that the “accident” could be a form of coercion or test of Norway’s emergency response. A Norwegian Navy frigate was dispatched to stand by the vessel, and once temporary repairs were made, police ordered the Ruby out to anchor at a safe distance pending investigation. While no proof emerged that this was deliberate hostile action, Norwegian security experts noted the Ruby incident reminded of vulnerabilities – an ostensibly civilian ship with dangerous cargo can create a hybrid threat by simply being in trouble near critical sites. Norway is now considering tighter rules for granting port access to such ships and improving its readiness for “unnatural disasters” that might be engineered as sabotage.

Beyond physical infrastructure, electronic warfare and espionage activities by Russia have intensified in Norway’s far north:

  • Since 2017 there have been periodic reports of GPS signal jamming in Finnmark (Norway’s northeastern tip) during Russian military exercises across the border. These incidents have increased dramatically after 2022. By the end of 2023, GPS interference was recorded almost daily in areas near the Norway-Russia frontier, disrupting civilian aviation and ship navigation. Norway’s Communications Authority confirmed nearly 300 jamming incidents in 2023, more than double the 122 logged in 2022. The jamming has affected aircraft flying to and from Kirkenes airport and hampered air ambulance services, posing safety risks. The source is traced to Russian Army electronic warfare units based just across the border, likely aiming to interfere with NATO systems and Ukrainian drones but spilling over onto Norwegian territory. Norwegian officials see this as deliberate intimidation – a signal that Russia can reach into NATO airspace without firing a shot. It forces costly work-arounds and could slow NATO responses in a crisis. While Finland and Estonia have publicly protested Moscow’s GPS jamming – even summoning Russian diplomats in protest – Norway tends to handle it in quieter diplomatic or military-to-military channels. However, the issue is well-known; local Norwegian police have warned that jamming could endanger lost hikers or fishermen if emergency services can’t locate them. In essence, the High North has become an electronic battlefield in peacetime.
  • Norway has cracked down on Russian covert espionage under cover of civilian travel. In the autumn of 2022, following the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines, Norway experienced a wave of mysterious drone sightings near its offshore oil & gas platforms – the backbone of Europe’s energy supply post-Russia. In October 2022, at least seven Russian nationals were arrested in separate incidents for illegally flying drones or taking photographs in sensitive areas of Norway. One high-profile case was Andrey Yakunin, the son of a Putin ally, who was caught flying drones in Svalbard and on mainland Norway and later jailed for 90 days. Another Russian, caught at the Storskog border checkpoint with two drones and 4 terabytes of footage of Norwegian sites, admitted to travelling across Norway “as a tourist”, taking photos and video with drones. This occurred amid numerous drone sightings over North Sea oil platforms, key onshore processing plants, and even above Norway’s military garrisons. The timing – just after the Nord Stream blasts – put Norway on heightened alert. In response, the Norwegian Armed Forces deployed additional Home Guard and police units to guard critical energy infrastructure, and the government banned all Russian-operated drones and flights in Norwegian airspace, a ban punishable by 3 years in prison. These measures likely helped reduce overt drone intrusions, though espionage by other means undoubtedly continues.

Norway’s overall response to Russia’s hybrid provocation in the north has been a mix of prudent military countermeasures, legal steps, and allied cooperation.

Creation of the Finnmark Brigade – Parade at Porsangmoen in connection with the establishment of the Finnmark Brigade. (Image: Forsvaret.no)
  • Enhanced Military Presence: The Norwegian military has upped its presence in the High North. Even before 2022, Norway re-established a dedicated Finnmark land defence and rotated more troops for Arctic training. Since the war, it has further increased patrols, intel sharing, and exercises in the region. The new defence plan explicitly allocates resources to surveillance, presence and control in Norway’s adjacent seas and territories. Norway’s five new P-8A Poseidon patrol aircraft are now operating from Evenes Air Base in Nordland, monitoring the Barents Sea for submarines and suspicious vessels – a direct boost to situational awareness along the Russian naval routes. The Navy and Coast Guard are likewise more active around critical undersea cables and oil rigs. In 2023, Norway even created a dedicated Underwater Intervention Team to inspect seabed infrastructure after the spate of sabotage incidents.
  • Allied Reinforcement and Intel Sharing: As a founding NATO member, Norway has leaned on allied support to deter threats. Following the drone and pipeline incidents, several NATO countries (UK, Germany, France) sent maritime patrol aircraft and specialized ships to help Norway watch over oil and gas installations in the North Sea and Arctic. NATO has also bolstered its exercises in Scandinavia; the Cold Response 2022 exercise in Norway (ironically held just after Russia invaded Ukraine) was one of the largest Arctic drills since the Cold War, sending a clear message of alliance solidarity. With Finland and Sweden now joining NATO, the entire Nordic region is integrating defence efforts. Norway is improving its infrastructure to host and transit allied reinforcements quickly through its territory – for example, upgrading ports, airfields, and prepositioned stocks in Troms and Finnmark. This not only helps NATO’s collective defence but serves as a signal to Russia that any aggression or severe provocation in the High North would be met by many nations, not Norway alone.
  • Legal and Protective Measures: Norway and its neighbours are moving to plug legal loopholes exploited by Russian “civilian” assets. The Norwegian government has discussed requiring higher transparency for vessels seeking refuge in its waters, including detailed cargo declarations, building on regulations updated in 2018. Regionally, there are talks of mandating insurance and tougher inspections for vessels that could threaten undersea cables or carry hazardous loads. Additionally, Norway has tightened visa rules for Russian nationals, increased counter-intelligence efforts against Russian spies, and expelled a number of undeclared intelligence officers from the Russian embassy in Oslo. The arrest and prosecution of drone-operators under new laws also demonstrates Norway’s willingness to enforce its sovereignty within the grey zone between war and peace.
  • Public Vigilance and Resilience: Norwegian authorities have urged critical industries and even the public to maintain vigilance. The Petroleum Safety Authority issued alerts to offshore platform operators about drone sightings and unknown vessels, leading to temporary heightened security levels at North Sea facilities in late 2022. The populace in the north has been advised to report strange activities – for instance, unusual drone flights or divers near cable landing sites. There is also a push to improve redundancy and resilience – e.g., having backup communications in case of GPS outage or cable cuts, hardening nodes of the power grid, and running “total defence” drills that involve civilian agencies alongside the military.

Russia’s hybrid operations in the High North – though deniable and below the threshold of armed attack – have been persistent and serious. They range from electronic harassment to potential sabotage, and even use the risk of environmental or industrial disaster as a pressure tactic. Norway has not responded with alarmist moves, but rather with steady and sober measures: investing in better surveillance, working with allies, and quietly neutralising threats, as seen by the interception of suspect ships and spies. The goal is to raise the cost for any Russian mischief in or around Norway, thereby deterring escalation.

Norwegian vessel carrying out patrols and training in the north ahead of USS Gerald R. Ford’s visit to Oslo. (Image: Forsvaret.no)
INorwegian vessel carrying out patrol in the north ahead of USS Gerald R. Ford’s visit to Oslo. (Image: Forsvaret.no)

At the same time, Norwegian leaders candidly acknowledge that the strategic environment has changed for the long term. The head of Norway’s military research institute (FFI) noted that even a weakened Russia can remain assertive in Norway’s vicinity – and that “the threat now consists of complex threats and nuclear weapons” rather than a conventional invasion. Moscow’s heavy investment in the Northern Fleet, including new nuclear submarines and hypersonic missiles, continues despite the Ukraine war. Thus, Norway’s dual-track approach is prudent: build up hard defence – troops, ships, jets – to ensure credible deterrence and bolster total defence against the shadowy tactics already in play. The “long peace” after 1991 has given way to a new era of vigilance in the North.

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