Iran’s Hypersonic Threat: Can Israel’s Missile Shield Keep Up?

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Iran fields a wide range of ballistic missiles, from traditional systems following high-arcing trajectories to newer hypersonic types capable of low-level flight and evasive manoeuvres. These pose a serious challenge to even the most advanced air defence systems—Israel’s included.

Missile defence isn’t optional for a country like Israel. Under near-constant threat from Iran and its proxies, Israel has built the world’s most sophisticated layered air defence network, capable of engaging incoming missiles at multiple stages of flight. As of mid-June 2025, Iran had launched more than 400 missiles at Israel in less than a week.

That system includes three key components: Arrow, David’s Sling, and Iron Dome. The Arrow system handles long-range exo-atmospheric interceptions. Iron Dome deals with short-range threats such as rockets and mortars. David’s Sling—recently ordered by Finland—fills the gap between them, targeting medium- and long-range missiles within the atmosphere.

All three systems were deployed during Iran’s recent missile attacks in June 2025 and largely succeeded. But no defence is invulnerable. With enough projectiles launched at once, even the most layered system can be overwhelmed

Shahab and the MaRV Threat

Iran’s Shahab series of missiles—and its numerous subvariants—are typical medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). The missile has a range of 1,000–2,000 km, reaching altitudes up to ~400 km. In its terminal phase, velocity can approach Mach 7 (~2.4 km/s) at low altitude before atmospheric drag begins to reduce speed.

Exo-atmospheric interception of an Iranian ballistic missile at approximately 100 km altitude by an Arrow 3 anti-ballistic missile. The distinct violet bloom marks the kinetic impact.
(Image: X / @visegrad24)

The Shahab‑3B uses a triconic “baby-bottle” aeroshell design, improving lift-to-drag ratio compared to the original cone-shaped warhead. This enhanced aerodynamics extend manoeuvrability and improve accuracy. Warhead mass drops from ~1,000 kg to ~700 kg as a result.

Some Shahab variants are equipped with manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles, manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle (MaRVs) variants, such as the Shahab‑3B and Emad. They include small steerable guidance fins. At high speeds and altitudes, these fins allow the warhead to shift course mid-flight, complicating interception. They remain stowed during boost and deploy after warhead separation, enabling mid-course trajectory adjustments during terminal descent—precisely when interception probability rises.

The flight path of a two-stage medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). The trajectory, determined by required range, closely resembles that of the Iranian Ghadr-1. In this model, the missile travels 1,650 kilometres with an apogee of 550 kilometres—equivalent to a launch from western Iran to Israel. The second-stage booster burns out well before apogee, after which the warhead separates. Booster stages then fall back to Earth, posing potential risks to civilians if overpopulated areas are below. Iranian booster debris has previously been found in Jordanian desert regions.
(Image: Analysis of Re-entry Vehicle Flight Dynamics, MBDA Deutschland GmbH, Yuriy Metsker et al.)

Despite achieving hypersonic speeds during descent, Shahab‑3’s MaRV remains thrustless once warhead separation occurs. While these warheads achieve hypersonic speeds, with their limited manoeuvre via fins and no lift surfaces for gliding, it does not qualify as a hypersonic glide vehicle.

Data published by MBDA Deutschland GmbH on typical MRBM flight dynamics closely resemble Iran’s Ghadr-1, indicating the sophistication of these systems.

Hypersonic Escalation: The Fattah-1

On 15 June 2025, Iran claimed to have fired its first-generation Fattah-1 hypersonic missiles at Israeli targets. Iran boasts a range of 1,400 km and speeds between Mach 13 and Mach 15.

The velocity profile of the same missile modelled by MBDA. Following second-stage burnout, the missile reaches a velocity of 3,700 m/s—equivalent to nearly Mach 11, well within hypersonic classification. At apogee (400 seconds into flight), the warhead travels at 2,250 m/s (Mach 6.6), still hypersonic. As the warhead descends, gravity increases its speed once more to 3,700 m/s, before rapid deceleration due to atmospheric drag. Terminal (impact) velocity is approximately 1,400 m/s—around Mach 4.1—thus no longer hypersonic. This is because the warhead lacks propulsion and cannot sustain hypersonic speeds through atmospheric drag.
(Source: Analysis of Re-entry Vehicle Flight Dynamics, MBDA Deutschland GmbH, Yuriy Metsker et al.)

Fattah-1 uses a solid-fuel booster and a detachable, independently propelled warhead. The warhead’s own engine allows it to continue powered flight and manoeuvre through the terminal phase—making it significantly harder to track and intercept.

Iran’s Fattah‑1 warhead is not a true hypersonic glide vehicle—it has no lift surfaces and is not designed to glide. Its shape is rotationally symmetric, lacking fins or wings for lift; once separated, the warhead simply continues on its trajectory under its own thrust and gravity. Although the warhead has a solid‑fuel sustainer motor and thrust-vector control, enabling limited manoeuvre, these are only for course correction in the terminal phase, not gliding flight.

This design matches a MaRV (manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle) rather than a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV). MaRVs can tweak their path but lack sustained lift or aerodynamic glide surfaces. True hypersonic glide vehicles—used by the U.S. or China—glide extensively through the atmosphere at low altitude. The Fattah‑1 simply maintains thrust-propelled hypersonic velocity during terminal descent, with modest directional control.

Unlike traditional ballistic missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles fly at lower altitudes to evade long-range SAM systems. Yet they still fly too high for short-range air defences. This makes them notoriously difficult to counter using conventional missile interceptors.

Physics still applies: the longer the range, the higher the missile must arc. A Fattah-1 fired at maximum range will almost certainly exceed the Kármán line (100 km altitude). This is when the warhead separates and begins its powered descent. That’s also the best—and perhaps only—moment to attempt interception. Its ability to adjust dive angles during descent adds a further layer of difficulty. A steep vertical dive exploits radar blind spots and compresses reaction time for defenders on the ground.

The Fattah-1 missile’s warhead section features its own independent solid-fuel propulsion system. This allows it to maintain high terminal velocity and carry out evasive manoeuvres during descent.
(Image: X / @Defence_Index)

War of Attrition Looming

The current Iran-Israel conflict appears headed for a grinding war of attrition. Israel continues to strike purely military targets inside Iran—mainly command centres, radar sites, and suspected nuclear infrastructure. Iran’s retaliatory salvos, however, have targeted both military and civilian areas, including parts of Tel Aviv, resulting in civilian casualties and infrastructure damage.

Whether Israel can sustain its interceptor stockpile longer than Iran can maintain its missile barrage remains uncertain. Israel’s Iron Dome interceptors are expensive. Iran, on the other hand, appears to be producing Shahab-class MRBMs and other variants in large numbers, reportedly with North Korean and Russian technical assistance.

Meanwhile, the United States’ position remains murky. There are reports of U.S. satellite early warning and logistics support, but there were no clear indication yet of direct military involvement, until USA joined the Israel air campaign on June 22th 2025 by attacking three Iranian nuclear sites.

A collapse of the Iranian regime may be the strategic endgame for Israel—but short of that, the defence calculus depends on who exhausts their arsenal first.

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