Emerging and Disruptive: Who Dares, Wins
Emerging and disruptive technology, or EDT, is today’s buzzword used to describe a fundamental change that technological development brings. Emerging refers to new applications that are not foreseen or recognized now. As these technologies mature and become more widespread, sources of innovation will be more diverse. This will inevitably bring up totally new applications that the original developers did not consider when developing the core technology.
By Colonel Jyri Kosola, Finnish Defence Forces, Research Director
Disruptive refers to an abrupt and major change in business logic, concept or structures.
In civilian business, disruptive technologies drive companies out of business, create new business areas, or force companies to change their earning logic. In defence, disruptive technologies on the one hand render current capability concepts obsolete, but on the other hand, they open new possibilities to provide the required capabilities.
Foresighting easy, anticipation hard
European Defence Agency has recognized several critical technologies. NATO has provided a very similar list of EDTs. Also, several EU and NATO countries have defined their own sets of technologies they consider important and have disruptive effects. There seems to be a shared understanding of which technologies are critical and how these technologies evolve. This is the easy part in foresighting, as it does not involve hard decisions.
The difficult part is the implication analysis; what should be done and when in order to be prepared for the disruption. I attended some weeks ago a high-level specialist meeting titled “Are our major weapon systems obsolete?” Those advocating change pointed out technologies challenging legacy systems. Those defending current systems argued that with the given capability requirements, the inevitable solution is a multirole fighter plane, a major surface combatant, or a main battle tank. The logic is clear and true: with the given capability, and requirements, like firepower, speed on harsh terrain, ballistic protection, etc., the obvious and most probably only solution is a heavy-tracked vehicle with a high-velocity cannon and strong frontal armour. The same applies to air and maritime domains.
Problem stated is not solution
NATO capability model fails to recognize disruption.
One should notice the words “with the given capability requirements“.
Different weapon systems are required to deliver different functional capabilities. Military capabilities are specified by capability models, which are built upon an agreed common taxonomy. NATO taxonomy divides capabilities into seven (7) capability areas:
- prepare,
- project,
- engage,
- sustain,
- protect,
- inform and
- consult, command & control.
The weakness of the NATO model is that it jumps almost immediately from the problem statement (e.g. need to engage or protect) to solution (e.g. frigate or infantry battalion).
If the operational need is not analyzed deeply enough before jumping into solution definition, there is obviously a very high risk that different possibilities are not seen, and cross-cutting effects of different combinations are not recognized.
In the modern networked 7-dimensional (land, air, sea, space, electromagnetic spectrum, cyber, cognition) battlespace everything is connected to everything. As Western armed forces are building multi-domain capabilities for all-domain operations, it would be important, if not mandatory, to have a capability development framework to suit that. Whereas the NATO capability model fails in this, the U.S. model fares better.
The U.S. taxonomy is suited to fit the American Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). It defines eight (8) joint capability areas (JCA);
- force integration,
- battlespace awareness,
- force application,
- logistics,
- command and control, communications and computers,
- protection,
- corporate management and
- support.
The challenge with the U.S. model is that it is intended to be used at a very high level in the system’s hierarchy. It suits very well to Systems-of-Systems level, but not that well weapon platforms.
Disruption is operational, not tactical
The profound limitation of both NATO and the U.S. models is that they do not address the operational need.
There is no operational need to drive cross-country at high speed, even though it is fun. Or, to be precise, there is a tactical need for that if the chosen operational concept is based on a tank.
In the Finnish capability model, the operational need is defined as the capability to project a desired effect in time and space.
The effect could be protecting commercial sea traffic, providing situational awareness, etc. The Finnish model allows different operational and system concepts to be innovated. The derived capability requirements are different if the concept is based on escorting traffic, providing air cover or clearing the threats, over-the-horizon or airborne sensors, satellites or patrol vessels. Different options have different sets of capabilities that can deliver the required capability but also support other capabilities in other systems. This complex network of mutual support and interdependency is called a System-of-Systems (SoS). SoS provides emergent capabilities, like Any-Sensor-to-Any-Shooter (AS2AS), which in turn may lead to disruption through new force structures and force application models, like the DARPA Mosaic Warfare concept.
Disruption requires disruptive thinking and framework with enough freedom of conceptual maneuver. There should be a clear separation between the problem space (i.e. operational requirements derived from strategic goals) and the solution space (capability targets, unit structures, platforms, gear, and gadgets). The framework could be a combination of NATO and the U.S. models.
Yes and no, or the other way
Back to the original question: Are our major weapon systems obsolete?
The answer is yes and no.
Firstly, it is the safest answer, regarding your both credibility and career prospects.
Secondly, the answer clearly depends on at what level this question is asked. At the tactical level, the answer in many cases is no, as our legacy systems are effective in the battlefield. At the operational level (i.e. concept) many would say yes or maybe. At strategic (i.e. doctrine) the answer would most probably be yes. It is yes if you want to punch through enemy defences and drive deep into the enemy’s rear to destroy its centre of gravity. You need head-on fighting capabilities. Then the most obvious solution is a main battle tank (MBT) supported by infantry in armoured fighting vehicles (AFV), artillery, air defence, mine clearance and obstacle crossing combat engineers, and long logistics tail. Other options could be deep precision strikes, stalking drones, and ambushing ground robots creating havoc, confusion, and panic, followed by infantry in armoured personnel carriers (APC).
Where speed is vital
With drones as eyes and ears and onboard non-line-of-sight (NLOS) weapons, the APC can fight both MBTs and AFVs at standoff distances. Therefore, it would not need heavy ballistic protection. Speed, mobility, flexibility, and network are vital.
Relatively light AFV could swim and therefore would not need bridge layers to cross rivers. Smaller force that is more maneuverable, could exploit stealth and speed in protection. In this kind of asymmetric scenario, the strength of the main battle tank, namely integration of firepower, mobility, and protection, can be turned a weakness: MBT needs to close in in order to be able to detect and engage its adversary and to expose the crew while doing so.
Of course, the AFV based networked concept has its own weaknesses. Therefore, both concepts have pros and cons. These must be evaluated at the force level, which could mean division or brigade. At lower levels, the systemic effects cannot be seen and evaluated.
Emerging technologies provide already now keys for disruption.
Disruption in military capabilities will be based on systems-of-systems level innovations. It will require suitable capability models and out-of-the-box thinking.
The SAS motto applies also here: who dares, wins.
