The support provided by US President Donald Trump’s administration to the same far-right forces that Moscow’s genocidal regime has overtly and covertly backed for years has caused growing alarm across Europe. In the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, right-wing populist parties — like elsewhere in Europe — have steadily increased their support in recent years. Both voters and representatives of these parties have often expressed, either openly or more subtly, sympathy for pro-Russian policies.
[Authors: Veikko Jarmala, doctoral researcher at the University of Helsinki, analyses the Estonian opposition party, the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (EKRE). Senior news analyst Kerkko Paananen explores Latvia’s “Trumpist” opposition party, Latvia First (LPV), as well as Lithuania’s far-right populist party, Dawn of Nemunas (PPNA), which is part of the country’s current three-party coalition government.]
Estonia’s Populist Red Barons
The Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (EKRE) is a nationalist-populist party led since 2020 by Martin Helme, son of the party’s former chairman, Mart Helme. The latter’s wife, Helle-Moonika Helme, also plays a key role in the party’s management, reinforcing the common perception of EKRE as a family-run enterprise. In the Estonian party political system, EKRE is widely regarded as the closest equivalent to the far right. However, characterising the party as right-wing is somewhat debatable, as its origins trace back to the People’s Union of Estonia, which was a prominent political party founded by the so-called “red barons” — former heads of Soviet collective farms.
Less-educated voters in Estonia’s rural regions remain EKRE’s core support base. The party has consistently evoked a certain nostalgia for Estonia’s Soviet past, emphasising the importance of Russia as a neighbour and expressing an emotional attachment to the social conservatism of the Soviet occupation era. Mart Helme’s professional background is rooted in ideological work for the Communist Party of Estonia, including his role as editor of the Estonian edition of the Communist Manifesto. His tenure as Estonia’s ambassador to Moscow from 1994 to 1999 ended in unclear circumstances.
Originally a Eurosceptic and an anti-Russian nationalist party, EKRE soon shifted its strategy and began to court Estonia’s Russian-speakers. The party adopted rhetoric centred on “traditional family values,” Euroscepticism, anti-government sentiment, and rejection of Ukrainian refugees. At the outset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, EKRE’s position was notably ambivalent. The party’s resistance to banning Russia’s pro-war symbols stood in stark contrast to nationalist sentiment in Estonia. Also, the Helmes refused to sign a parliamentary declaration condemning Russian war crimes in Ukraine as genocide. However, EKRE did back the government’s draft legislation on removing Soviet monuments in Estonia.
In spring 2024, the Helmes orchestrated a purge within EKRE, resulting in the departure of nearly half of the party’s MPs and its sole MEP. EKRE has since shifted even more decisively towards a pro-Russian position. The party portrays Russia as a force helping undermine the European Union and defend “traditional values” against Western decadence. While EKRE previously supported increasing Estonia’s defence budget, it has since begun denouncing what it calls “warmongering.” The party now opposes raising defence spending and expanding military training areas. Ahead of the parliamentary elections in 2023, EKRE leader Martin Helme launched a verbal attack on the Estonian Defence Forces, falsely claiming that military aid to Ukraine had stripped Estonia of all its heavy weaponry.
EKRE’s official party publication, Uued Uudised, rebroadcasts Russian propaganda narratives under the guise of “free speech,” while disassociating itself from the content that it publishes. Uued Uudised typically prefers to publish short, emotionally charged texts that lack sourcing and fail to identify the author. Another online outlet closely affiliated with EKRE is Objektiiv, which is published by EKRE MP Varro Vooglaid’s Foundation for Family and Tradition (SAPTK). Objektiiv, which seeks to project a more respectable image, openly echoes Russian narratives and strongly supports the policies of US President Donald Trump. EKRE’s internal purge has further consolidated Vooglaid’s influence within the party. He has publicly stated his willingness to live under Russian occupation if its regime aligns with his values. Also, he has been a vocal supporter of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Partiarchate.
In spring 2024, Estonia’s social-democratic interior minister, Lauri Läänemets, proposed banning the operations of the Moscow Patriarchate in Estonia. EKRE opposed the proposal, seizing on the minister’s leftist party affiliation. The party has framed the proposed ban as a campaign driven by “extremist atheist Marxist socialists,” designed to persecute Christians and undermine “traditional values.” In doing so, EKRE seeks to tap into the negative memories in Estonia of the state-imposed atheism of the Soviet era.
However, what EKRE fails to mention is that the Moscow Patriarchate itself is a remnant of the Soviet occupation of Estonia. Prior to World War II, independent Estonia had its own Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church (EAÕK), which falls under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. During the Soviet occupation, the authorities banned the EAÕK and placed Estonia’s Orthodox Christians under the control of the Moscow Partiarchate. While the EAÕK continued to operate in exile, it officially resumed its activities in Estonia in 1993. In contrast, the Russian Orthodox Church in Estonia remains predominantly Russian, in terms of both its members and its clergy.
According to Mari-Liis Jakobson, Associate Professor of Political Sociology at the University of Tallinn, and Andres Kasekamp, Professor of History at the University of Toronto, “EKRE is in the paradoxical situation of being an Estonian nationalist party attempting to appeal to Estonia’s sizeable Russian minority.” They argue that the party’s messaging is duplicitous: “When communicating with their Russian-speaking audience, they play on their anti-Ukrainian sentiment, [whereas] when addressing their Estonian audience, they appeal to anti-Russian sentiment.” This effort to attract Russian minority voters has also shaped the party’s foreign policy rhetoric. Instead of labelling Russia as an “enemy,” Mart Helme describes it as a “great civilisation” and urges Estonia to pursue good neighbourly relations.
However, EKRE’s increasingly pro-Russian position has not translated into a significant rise in support among Russian-speaking voters. The Estonian Centre Party remains by far the most popular choice among non-Estonian voters with 60% support, while EKRE’s backing within this demographic has remained rather steady at around 10%. At the same time, EKRE’s pro-Russian stance has alienated many Estonian voters, contributing to a surge in support for Estonia’s mainstream conservative party, Fatherland, which is currently polling at around 30%. EKRE’s current standing in the polls appears to reflect general dissatisfaction with the government. Still, it remains to be seen whether mere resentment, constant grievance-driven messaging, and anti-government rhetoric alone will be enough to translate into meaningful electoral success for the party.
Political Comeback of Latvian Oligarch
Since Latvia regained its independence from Soviet occupation in the early 1990s, the most potent far-right political force in the country has been the nationalist-conservative party, National Alliance. The party was a member of every governing coalition from 2011 until the formation of Prime Minister Evika Siliņa’s current three-party cabinet in September 2023. According to Assistant Professor Daunis Auers of the University of Latvia, National Alliance’s participation in government has led to the party’s mainstreaming, creating space for new populist movements to emerge. The most successful among them so far are the far-right Latvia First (LPV) and the openly pro-Russian For Stability.
LPV’s leader is the local businessman and former deputy prime minister Ainārs Šlesers. He is a “political serial entrepreneur,” one of Latvia’s three infamous “oligarchs.” Over the years, he has spearheaded at least half a dozen different party political projects. Šlesers was forced to withdraw from active politics in 2011 after then-President Valdis Zatlers dissolved parliament amid a corruption probe involving Šlesers and other oligarchs. The coronavirus pandemic opened a window of opportunity for Šlesers to stage a political comeback. He founded the Latvia First party in the summer of 2021 and immediately launched an aggressive campaign against the government’s anti-COVID restrictions.
Latvia’s populist politicians and parties found common ground in their opposition to national pandemic restrictions and the COVID vaccination drive, with Šlesers emerging as one of the movement’s key leaders. Many of Latvia’s most prominent pro-Russian propagandists also joined the anti-vaccination campaign. The campaigners forged close ties with like-minded movements in neighbouring Estonia and Lithuania. The party led by Šlesers has long promoted so-called traditional family values while opposing the fundamental human rights of sexual minorities in Latvia. The campaign has closely mirrored the narratives and tactics typical of Russia’s state-run propaganda.
Šlesers, a native speaker of both Latvian and Russian, and his party have sought to attract voters from Latvia’s sizeable Russian minority. Many candidates from predominantly Russian minority parties have defected to LPV. There is considerable overlap between LPV’s platform and that of the so-called Russian parties, including their generally sympathetic stance towards Russia, opposition to the anti-COVID restrictions, and resistance to the rights of sexual and gender minorities. Recently, Šlesers has adopted a distinctly “Trumpian” rhetoric, frequently referencing the Trump administration’s ideas on reorganising the government and endorsing Trump’s coercive “peace plan” to end the war in Ukraine.
Šlesers has centred much of his political activity on defending Latvia’s struggling transit sector, where he has concentrated the bulk of his investments. After he was forced to step back from active politics, Šlesers, together with his wealthy business partner and former Latvian transport minister Andris Šķēle, set up a joint venture with Russia’s state-owned railway company, Russian Railways. Before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Šlesers voiced opposition to the international sanctions imposed on Russia after its annexation of Crimea and supported closer ties with Moscow. A stevedoring company partly owned by Šlesers’s family has continued to do business with Russia, despite EU sanctions.
Šlesers has declared that his objective is to first unseat the governing coalition in Latvia’s capital, Riga, and then in the national parliament, the Saeima. He has announced his ambition to become mayor of Riga following the municipal elections in June 2025, after which he aims to pursue the position of prime minister. Currently, his party holds eight seats in the Saeima. Latvia’s political landscape is highly fragmented, and despite polling at just 8%, LPV ranks as the country’s second-most popular party. In Riga, the party leads the polls with 12% support. However, LPV’s prospects of securing enough partners to form a governing coalition appear slim.
Lithuanian Rabble-rouser Serving Russia
The largest force on Lithuania’s far right is the newly formed radical populist party, Dawn of Nemunas (PPNA), founded in November 2023 by antisemitic MP Remigijus Žemaitaitis. In a surprising outcome, PPNA placed second in Lithuania’s 2024 parliamentary elections, and the party now has 19 seats in the national parliament, the Seimas. PPNA’s electoral success came as a shock, but an even bigger shock followed when the winner of the elections, the Social Democratic Party of Lithuania (LSDP), reversed its earlier pledge and invited PPNA to join the government. The decision triggered protests both inside and outside Lithuania. PPNA has appointed three ministers to the LSDP-led three-party coalition government.
Žemaitaitis secured over 9% of the vote in the first round of Lithuania’s 2024 presidential elections. In the second round, he endorsed incumbent President Gitanas Nausėda, whose stance towards PPNA and its controversial leader appears to be shifting from month to month. A major surprise of the elections was the strong performance of candidates sympathetic to Russia, much of whose support came from Lithuania’s Polish and Russian minorities. In the subsequent parliamentary elections, PPNA succeeded in capturing the majority of these protest votes. The party’s electoral lists featured numerous candidates who had previously been affiliated with the openly pro-Russian Labour Party.
A distinctive feature of Lithuanian society is its religious conservatism. For the country’s Polish minority, this serves as a means of safeguarding their cultural identity, contrasting with the more pluralistic values of the ethnic Lithuanian majority. Additionally, a noticeable value gap exists between the capital, Vilnius, and Lithuania’s outlying regions. PPNA and its illiberal leader, Žemaitaitis, have sought to exploit these societal fault lines. Žemaitaitis has fuelled hostility towards women’s rights, sexual minorities, and immigrants. This incitement reached a fever pitch during the coronavirus pandemic, when protests against the health restrictions and vaccinations culminated in a violent riot in Vilnius.
Like the far-right movements in Estonia and Latvia, much of the support for PPNA rests on latent Soviet-era nostalgia, on the idea that “life was better before.” The sweeping societal changes since Lithuania regained its independence, including the economic transformation, European integration, and social liberalisation, have faced significant resistance, particularly in smaller towns and rural areas. Russian propaganda has exploited these same grievances, which partly helps explain why the ostensibly nationalist PPNA and its abrasive leader show less aversion to Russia and its malign narratives.
One of the most common themes of Lithuanian public discourse that is favourable to Russia relates to attitudes towards neighbouring Belarus. This issue strained relations between Lithuania’s president and the government throughout the previous centre-right coalition led by Prime Minister Ingrida Šimonytė. The dispute has centred on the question of how to implement sanctions against Belarus. Žemaitaitis has openly criticised the sanctions, arguing that they hurt the competitiveness of Lithuanian business, particularly in the port city of Klaipėda, which has a sizeable Russian minority population. He has advocated for a “Lithuanian reset” of sorts, aimed at improving ties with Belarus.
Since joining the new coalition government, Žemaitaitis has challenged the official target to increase Lithuania’s defence spending, a move that could potentially lead to an eventual collapse of the fragile three-party coalition. PPNA holds a pivotal role, given that the main coalition party, LSDP, refuses to work with the conservative Homeland Union, while the junior coalition partner, the Union of Democrats for Lithuania (DSVL), rejects cooperation with the centrist opposition party, the Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union (LVŽS). Moreover, Žemaitaitis has criticised Lithuania’s substantial financial and material aid to Ukraine, baselessly alleging that the assistance is being embezzled. Such assertions have continued to add fuel to accusations that PPNA is, in fact, serving Russian interests.
Baltic Far Right Facing a Choice
Despite Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, political forces promoting pro-Russian narratives and amplifying Kremlin disinformation remain active in the Baltic states. These influence campaigns have largely focused on issues such as the status of the Russian language and the Russian Orthodox Church, the domestic impact of international sanctions against Russia and Belarus, and the defence of so-called “traditional family values.” However, following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, open expressions of sympathy for Russia have become significantly more marginalised in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, where the overwhelming majority of the population supports Ukraine and backs the firmly Western-oriented foreign and security policies of the Baltic governments.
Despite their precarious security situation, the three Baltic NATO member states have not fully succeeded in repelling Russia’s hostile influence operations within their political systems. While this article focuses on the populist far right, Russia-friendly forces are present across the entire political spectrum in all three countries — from mainstream parties to the fringes on both the left and right. The phenomenon is therefore not confined to the far right alone. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania all have not only openly pro-Russian parties, often purporting to represent the Russian-speaking minority, but also established parties whose rhetoric frequently aligns with Moscow’s propaganda narratives.
The recent rise of radical-right populist parties marks a significant shift in the political landscapes of all three Baltic states. The parties examined in this article — EKRE in Estonia, LPV in Latvia, and PPNA in Lithuania — have been outspoken in their support for the Trump administration and its disruptive policies. Going forward, this alignment may have a big impact on how voters perceive these polarising parties and their controversial leaders. Should the United States, under Trump’s leadership, abandon its commitment to a free Europe and move closer to Moscow’s genocidal regime, the Baltic “Trumpists” will be forced to make a choice. Given the overwhelming public rejection of Russian influence across Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the far-right “Trumpist” movements could soon find themselves politically isolated.
* Veikko Jarmala is a doctoral researcher at the University of Helsinki. His areas of expertise include Baltic studies, Estonian political history, nationalism and identity, and conservatism.
* Kerkko Paananen is a veteran news analyst with a particular focus on politics and the economy in the Baltic states and Russia. He is founder and editor-in-chief of Via Baltica.
* An edited version of this article first appeared in Finnish in The Ulkopolitist.
