Strategic attacks targeting critical infrastructure such as power grids, data networks, and water supply systems have become a significant threat. The ability to monitor and protect these assets continuously and comprehensively is crucial for maintaining national security.
By the end of the 20th century, discussions about strategic attacks as a threat model began to focus on assaults targeting the deep structures of society, paralyzing critical functions such as state leadership. Beyond military forces, aggressors would aim at critical infrastructure, including electricity, data networks, district heating, financial systems, and food and water distribution. Protecting electricity production facilities and thermal power plants is crucial but challenging, as observed during the Ukrainian conflict. In new NATO member countries like Finland and Sweden, the use of non-military means in threat scenarios is expected to increase.
Power lines, transformers, fibre optic cables, and water distribution networks are particularly vulnerable. War is ubiquitous; targets are everywhere, and preparations are constant. Evidence of wide-ranging hostile influence includes broken locks on water towers, severed optical cables, and fallen telecommunications masts.
Thus, society must continuously monitor and protect critical assets nationwide. The Defence Forces’ responsibilities include monitoring and safeguarding territorial integrity, a mission rooted in an era of conventional invasions. However, in the information age, influence operations can occur without armed forces and from outside the country’s territory. Yet, sabotaging telemasts, power lines, and water supplies still requires physical presence. Therefore, defenders need a comprehensive, real-time situational understanding of events, current status, and future developments.
Given the widespread distribution of assets, authorities must have a nationwide situational picture, shared across agencies to ensure cohesive operations. Ideally, a common situational information pool would allow all operators access to necessary data within their permissions.
In the past decade, system ownership and operation were prioritized. However, defence needs during peacetime are minimal compared to crises, leading to most systems being underutilized and quickly outdated. Consequently, it would be beneficial for multiple parties to use these systems and sensors regularly. This could be achieved by establishing a state-owned drone operator or developing strategic partnerships with reliable commercial firms.
National area surveillance requires both people and technology. A voluntary preparedness organization, as seen in other Nordic countries, could provide personnel where the Finnish Defence Forces are not present. Unmanned systems are essential for long-term surveillance in remote and arctic conditions. UGVs offer a temporal presence but limited regional coverage, while UAVs cover large areas temporarily. Satellite surveillance, despite offering spatial and temporal coverage, is unsuitable due to Finnish terrain, lighting, and weather. Pseudo-satellites have also proven ineffective due to northern latitude restrictions.
Lighter Than Air Surveillance
A Finnish company, Kelluu, has developed a lighter-than-air UAV for long-term or permanent area surveillance. Using hydrogen fuel cells for propulsion and payloads, these UAVs will be operating for three days. The lifting hydrogen can also serve as additional energy for payloads or propulsion, allowing aerodynamic flight even when heavier than air. These UAVs can withstand winds up to 15 m/s, providing 80% operational availability below cloud level, even in temperatures as low as -35°C.
These UAVs do not require fixed infrastructure, which would become the attacker’s primary target. They can be delivered to the operational area in a 40-foot container and need only a 50×50 m open area for launch and recovery. Their long operating time, regional coverage, and low cost enable the creation of situational pictures for multiple actors and disaster data services independent of terrestrial infrastructure. In crises, where cables break and masts fall, this capability is crucial for authorities’ situational awareness and command & control.
As technology advances and digitization deepens, data from various sources becomes increasingly available. Therefore, combining and analyzing data is more important than owning and operating sensors. The Pooling & Sharing principle would ensure more up-to-date sensors and better network coverage than if each operator managed their own systems. However, the readiness of military and civilian authorities to adopt this business model remains to be seen.
