In Severodvinsk on Russia’s Arctic coast, the Navy has just unveiled its latest nuclear submarine – the Khabarovsk, a vessel designed to carry the dreaded Poseidon nuclear torpedo drone. Dubbed a potential Doomsday Weapon, Poseidon is an autonomous, nuclear-propelled torpedo said to be capable of wiping out entire coastal cities with a massive thermonuclear blast.
The launch of Khabarovsk, presided over by Russian officials in early November 2025, marks a significant milestone for Moscow’s undersea forces. Just weeks prior, NATO’s Secretary General Mark Rutte had openly mocked the sorry state of another Russian submarine – a malfunctioning Kilo-class boat spotted “limping home” on the surface from the Mediterranean. Western officials ridiculing Russia’s naval troubles even as the Kremlin rolls out fearsome new submarines – encapsulates the dual reality of Russia’s submarine fleet today. Despite facing maintenance woes and recent setbacks, Russia is simultaneously introducing modern undersea capabilities that military experts caution should not be underestimated.
Khabarovsk and Poseidon: Unveiling a Doomsday Submarine
With the Khabarovsk launch, Russia has debuted a wholly new class of submarine purpose-built to carry the Poseidon nuclear-powered drone torpedo. Poseidon, also known as Status-6, is essentially a giant undersea autonomous weapon – nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed, and with intercontinental range. Once deployed, it could traverse ocean basins at great depth and high speed, then detonate a multi-megaton warhead off an enemy’s coast. Russian officials boast that Poseidon’s speed, depth, and range are “unmatched” globally. According to state media, the drone can dive to 1,000 meters and carry a warhead up to 2 megatons – enough to obliterate enemy naval bases or coastal cities. Dmitry Medvedev, former president and current Security Council deputy chair, has ominously labelled Poseidon a true Doomsday Device, and a senior Duma defence official claimed it could “wipe out whole coastal nations” if unleashed.
The Khabarovsk submarine itself is shrouded in secrecy. Laid down in 2014 at the Sevmash shipyard, it was kept under wraps until its ceremonial rollout in November 2025. Only partial glimpses of the hull were shown, but naval analysts note its stern appears similar to the Borei-class ballistic missile subs, indicating it likely shares design elements for stealth and efficiency. In place of a missile compartment, however, Khabarovsk carries six enormous Poseidon torpedoes in its forward section. At about 113 meters long and 10,000 tons displacement, this submarine is smaller than a strategic missile boat but still heavily armed. Its nuclear reactor provides long endurance – reportedly up to 90–120 days of operation – allowing it to lurk under the polar ice or far out at sea. Russian Navy commanders classify Khabarovsk as a “heavy nuclear missile cruiser,” a hint at its strategic role even though it carries torpedoes instead of conventional missiles.
Military experts assess that the arrival of dedicated Poseidon-carrier subs could redefine undersea warfare. Unlike traditional ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) that launch predictable ballistic trajectories, a Poseidon-armed sub introduces a new second-strike threat that is harder to counter – essentially a stealth drone delivery of a nuclear warhead from below. H.I. Sutton, an undersea warfare analyst, wrote in a Council on Geostrategy recent report, that Khabarovsk “will likely be the defining submarine of the 2020s” due to this novel capability, and Western anti-submarine forces, particularly U.S. and UK navies, will be forced to make it a top priority target in the coming years. Sutton also reminded, that “the Russian Northern Fleet, the most likely adversary of the Royal Navy in any conflict, currently holds in its arsenal approximately 22 submarines.” The Poseidon drones’ mode of attack – sneaking deep underwater across oceans – presents new challenges for NATO’s detectors and defenders. Indeed, Russian President Vladimir Putin has touted that Poseidon’s unique speed and depth make it effectively impossible to intercept with current technology.
Russia’s investment in this doomsday torpedo project has been underway for years. The concept first leaked publicly in 2015 – likely intentionally, to send a strategic message – and Putin officially confirmed Poseidon’s development in 2018. Since then, Moscow periodically announced progress – from testing the drone’s reactor and propulsion, to building specialised carriers. Just days before Khabarovsk’s launch, Putin revealed a successful test of Poseidon on October 28, 2025: for the first time, a Poseidon was launched from a submarine and its compact nuclear reactor was activated during the trial. He noted the drone’s reactor is “a hundred times smaller” than a standard submarine reactor, yet powers the weapon’s long-range run. It wasn’t disclosed which submarine performed the test, but candidates include the Belgorod, a converted Oscar II-class sub that has served as a Poseidon testbed. The Belgorod is currently the only other submarine capable of deploying Poseidon drones and has been operating out of Severodvinsk as well. In fact, Belgorod – launched in 2019 – is an intriguing platform in its own right: at 184 meters it’s the world’s longest submarine, originally an Oscar-II cruise missile hull now modified for special missions. It can carry not only Poseidon torpedoes – up to six, like Khabarovsk – but also deep-diving mini-submarines such as the Losharik for seabed operations. Belgorod is part of Russia’s secretive GUGI fleet for deep-sea research and sabotage, able to host mini subs underneath its hull to tamper with undersea cables or infrastructure.
Together, Belgorod and Khabarovsk represent a new breed of strategic submarines focused on “strategic deterrence through undersea terror”. And more are coming: at least one sister ship, Ulyanovsk, is under construction, laid down in 2017, and Russian sources suggest that in total three to four Poseidon-carrying subs are planned across two slightly different project variants. Each of these could be armed with six Poseidon drones, potentially giving the Russian Navy an arsenal of two dozen doomsday torpedoes in the future. It is expected these subs will be split between the Northern and Pacific Fleets – one Khabarovsk-class serving in the Arctic-based Northern Fleet and another in the Pacific, according to reports. This would allow Russia to threaten maritime targets in both the Atlantic and Pacific theatres. For the moment, the Khabarovsk itself still has to undergo extensive sea trials; new Russian nuclear subs often spend a year or more on trials before commissioning, so it likely won’t join active service until 2026 or later. But the Navy’s message at the rollout ceremony was triumphant: the defence minister declared that this new submarine, with its “underwater robotic weapons,” will enable Russia to protect its maritime frontiers and national interests in all oceans. In short, Poseidon adds a frightening new leg to Russia’s nuclear triad – one intended to ensure that even if Russia’s land-based missiles and bombers are neutralised, a submarine lurking offshore could still deliver apocalyptic retaliation.
From the Kursk to Kalibr
Russia’s embrace of novel submarine technology comes after two tumultuous decades for its undersea fleet. At the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Navy boasted one of the world’s largest and most formidable submarine forces, ranging from huge Typhoon-class ballistic missile subs to squadrons of nuclear-powered attack subs prowling the Atlantic. The 1990s collapse of the USSR, however, sent the Russian Navy into steep decline – budgets dried up, maintenance was neglected, and dozens of boats were decommissioned or rusted away at the pier. The Kursk disaster in August 2000 symbolised this post-Soviet nadir. The Kursk, a 949A Oscar II-class nuclear cruise missile submarine, was participating in the Northern Fleet’s first major exercise in years when a torpedo onboard exploded, causing the sub to sink to the bottom of the Barents Sea. All 118 sailors and officers on Kursk perished, as Russian rescue efforts floundered and international help arrived too late. The tragedy – broadcast to the world in real time – exposed not only technical failings, a faulty torpedo and rescue system, but also an eroded state of training and emergency preparedness in Russia’s navy. President Vladimir Putin, only months in office at the time, was harshly criticised for the Navy’s failure and the secrecy that shrouded the incident. The Kursk disaster became a turning point: it painfully underscored that Russia’s once-proud submarine force had fallen into disrepair, and it spurred Putin’s government to invest anew in naval modernisation in the 2000s.
In the ensuing years, Russia slowly began recapitalising its undersea fleet – though not without setbacks. Old Soviet-era boats were scrapped or refitted, and design bureaus that survived the lean 90s, Rubin and Malakhit, were tasked with developing the next generation of submarines. The state consolidated shipyards and design centres under the United Shipbuilding Corporation by the late 2000s. By around 2010, with defence budgets rising on the back of oil revenues, Putin launched a broad naval rearmament program. A key priority was replacing ageing strategic missile submarines. The giant Typhoon-class, the largest subs ever built, were retired or repurposed, and the remaining 1970s-vintage Delta III and Delta IV subs would need successors. Thus, the Project 955 Borei-class SSBN – Russia’s new generation of ballistic missile submarine, intended as the backbone of its sea-based nuclear deterrent in the 21st century. The first Borei, Yuri Dolgorukiy, was laid down in 1996, but delays and funding issues meant it wasn’t commissioned until 2013. Since then, however, eight Borei-class boats, including improved variants, have been built or are in service as of 2025. Each carries 16 Bulava intercontinental ballistic missiles, each missile packing multiple nuclear warheads. These Borei SSBNs are far quieter and more modern than their predecessors, featuring pump-jet propulsors and other stealth technology. They now form the core of Russia’s strategic submarine force, gradually allowing the last Soviet-era boomers to retire. Russia had to keep two old Delta III boats operational longer than planned due to delays in the Borei program. Still, by 2023, the new Boreis will finally enable the retirement of those 1980s relics.
Russia also invested in new attack submarines to replace its Soviet-built nuclear attack boats – like the Akula, Victor, and Sierra classes. The result is the Project 885 Yasen-class – a nuclear-powered guided-missile submarine (SSGN) that is arguably the most capable multipurpose sub Russia has ever built. The first of the class, Severodvinsk, took nearly 20 years from keel-laying to commissioning (1993–2014) due to post-Soviet delays, but it proved the design. Improved Yasen-M variants have since followed: Kazan entered Northern Fleet service in 2021, Novosibirsk and Krasnoyarsk have joined the Pacific Fleet, and several more are under construction. These Yasen-class boats are armed with an array of long-range cruise missiles. including the Kalibr land-attack missile, P-800 Oniks anti-ship missiles, and, reportedly, the hypersonic Zircon in the future. They are designed for both anti-ship/anti-submarine roles and land-attack missions, essentially filling the role the older Oscar II SSGNs and Akula SSNs once played, but with greater stealth and multi-mission flexibility. The Russian Navy intends for the Yasen class to eventually replace most of its Soviet-era attack submarines.
By the late 2010s, these modernisation efforts started bearing fruit: Russia now fields a mixed fleet of modern subs, Boreis and Yasens, alongside upgraded or well-maintained Soviet-era boats, and it has significantly improved the fleet’s reliability compared to the 1990s. As of 2024, Russia’s navy commanded one of the largest submarine fleets in the world with roughly 64 vessels in total. This includes around 16 ballistic missile submarines, about 25 nuclear-powered attack/cruise submarines, and the rest diesel-electric submarines. Not all are fully operational at any given time, but these numbers underscore the scale. The Kremlin’s undersea buildup has been backed by hefty funding – in early 2025, Russia announced a new multi-decade naval investment plan worth 8.4 trillion rubles (over €86 billion), a significant portion of which is earmarked for submarines. President Putin has repeatedly emphasised that submarines are a mainstay of Russia’s nuclear deterrent and naval strategy, and he has lavished resources on the fleet since 2010. Consequently, despite the Russian Navy’s well-publicised troubles in other areas, like a dearth of large modern surface warships, undersea forces have seen considerable upgrades. “The Russian Navy has come a long way since its post-Soviet collapse and the operational disasters of the 2000s,” noted John Foreman, former UK defence attaché, in a Council of Geostrategy analysis, pointing out that its capabilities today should not be judged solely by those past woes.
Strategic Assets in the North, Diesels in the Littorals
Russia’s submarine force in 2025 spans a full spectrum of classes and missions, divided among four fleets: the Northern, Pacific, Black Sea, and Baltic Fleets. The Northern Fleet, based on the Kola Peninsula bordering the Arctic Ocean, is by far the most important. Headquartered in Severomorsk with multiple submarine bases along the Barents Sea coast, the Northern Fleet is home to the bulk of Russia’s nuclear-powered submarines and is considered the Navy’s elite formation. This includes the majority of SSBNs (strategic missile subs carrying nuclear SLBMs) responsible for the submarine leg of Russia’s strategic triad. Currently, the Northern Fleet operates a mix of new Borei-class SSBNs and older Delta IV-class boats, maintaining continuous at-sea deterrent patrols beneath the Arctic ice. For example, two Borei-A class subs – Knyaz Vladimir and Generalissimus Suvorov – have joined the Northern Fleet in recent years, alongside stalwarts like Tula and Yekaterinburg (Delta IVs) that remain in service. These submarines each carry 16 Bulava missiles, for Borei, or older Sineva missiles (for Delta IV), giving Moscow the ability to launch dozens of nuclear warheads from the Barents or Kara Seas as a second strike. The Arctic bastions north of Russia are ideal hiding areas for these SSBNs, and the Northern Fleet regularly trains for under-ice operations to ensure its missile subs can operate and even fire while concealed by polar ice cover. Notably, a Delta IV submarine for the first time test-launched a ballistic missile from under the ice of the Laptev Sea in 2023 – a demonstration of how Russia can now fire from “any part of the Arctic,” according to the Northern Fleet command, the Barents Observer reported. With tensions with the West rising, such Arctic deployments have only grown more assertive, as Russia signals that its nuclear submarines can strike from the High North with impunity.
The Northern Fleet also fields most of Russia’s top-tier nuclear attack submarines. The first Yasen-class sub, Severodvinsk, is based there, as is the Yasen-M Kazan. These are advanced multipurpose submarines armed with long-range Kalibr cruise missiles that can target ships or land targets in Europe from hundreds of kilometres away. Additionally, several Soviet-era Akula-class and Sierra-class attack submarines remain active in the Northern Fleet, providing a capable if ageing force for both escorting Russia’s SSBNs and stalking NATO submarines. These boats are tasked with defending the maritime approaches to northwest Russia and, in wartime, would attempt to break out into the North Atlantic through the GIUK (Greenland-Iceland-UK) gap. The Northern Fleet’s submarines, old and new, periodically surge into the North Atlantic – prompting NATO navies to shadow them. In one recent incident in August 2025, a modern Russian Yasen-M class sub approached a NATO carrier strike group led by USS Gerald R. Ford in the North Atlantic, triggering a multi-nation effort to track it. While the Russian sub was eventually monitored by allied warships and maritime patrol aircraft, the encounter was a stark reminder of Russia’s continued undersea reach and the cat-and-mouse games reminiscent of the Cold War.
On the other side of Eurasia, the Pacific Fleet, based in Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy, constitutes Russia’s second major submarine force. The Pacific Fleet has seen significant modernisation in recent years. As of 2023, it now has five Borei-class SSBNs assigned to it – including Aleksandr Nevsky and Vladimir Monomakh, first-generation Boreis – and newer units like Knyaz Oleg and Generalissimus Suvorov, which were transferred over the Northern Sea Route. This gives the Pacific Fleet a potent strategic deterrent aimed across the Pacific Ocean – covering the U.S. West Coast, Alaska, and Asia. The Pacific Fleet’s ageing Delta III-class SSBNs (based at Kamchatka) have thus been replaced by these modern Boreis, dramatically improving stealth and reliability. The Pacific also hosts a number of nuclear attack submarines, such as a few Akula-class boats and at least one Oscar II-class SSGN, Tomsk or Omsk. In recent years, the Pacific Fleet’s sub force was bolstered by improved Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines as well: between 2014 and 2016, Russia built six Project 636.3 Improved Kilos for the Pacific Fleet, enhancing its ability to patrol the Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk with quiet conventional submarines. These Kilos, armed with Kalibr cruise missiles, provide a strategic capability on a smaller regional scale – for instance, they could strike U.S. bases in Japan or Guam in a conflict. The Pacific Fleet’s subs also occasionally venture southwards; during tensions in 2021-22, Russian subs from the Pacific reportedly deployed into the central Pacific and even near Hawaii as a show of force. Moreover, at least one of the forthcoming Poseidon submarines, either the next Khabarovsk-class unit or Belgorod itself, is expected to join the Pacific Fleet, which would introduce the Poseidon nuclear drone threat to the Pacific theatre as well.
Russia’s two smaller fleets – the Black Sea Fleet and the Baltic Fleet – consist primarily of diesel-electric submarines for regional defence and strike missions. The Black Sea Fleet, based in Crimea, Sevastopol, and Krasnodar Krai, Novorossiysk, before the current war, maintained a squadron of six Improved Kilo-class submarines. These boats – e.g. Rostov-na-Donu, Novorossiysk and Kolpino – have been actively used to launch Kalibr cruise missiles against targets in Ukraine and Syria in recent years. However, the war in Ukraine has also put the Black Sea Fleet’s subs at risk. Ukraine has developed long-range strike capabilities and daring special operations that have managed to damage Russian naval units even in port. In September 2023, the submarine Rostov-na-Donu was hit by Ukrainian cruise missiles while in drydock at Sevastopol, suffering serious damage. British intelligence assessed that Rostov was likely a total loss, reducing the effective Black Sea submarine force. Meanwhile, another Kilo-class sub, Novorossiysk, became the focus of an international spectacle in October 2025 when it experienced a mechanical breakdown during a Mediterranean deployment and had to transit back to Russia on the surface with a tug escort – a highly unusual and vulnerable situation. It was this incident that drew jeers from NATO’s Mark Rutte, who quipped that the Russian submarine fleet now looked more like a hunt for a mechanic than The Hunt for Red October. Despite the mockery, the underlying cause – a reported serious fuel leak that forced the Kilo to surface near France – underscores the maintenance challenges facing Russia’s diesel subs after extended operations far from home. With Turkey closing the Bosphorus Strait to military vessels since 2022, the Black Sea Fleet’s submarines cannot easily rotate to outside theatres, leading to wear-and-tear from prolonged deployments and difficult repairs. Indeed, since Russia lost access to its Syrian maintenance base in Tartus in late 2024, its once-regular submarine presence in the Mediterranean has largely evaporated. By early 2025, the Navy had to send Black Sea Kilos all the way around Europe from the Baltic if they wanted to reach the Med, a 4,000 km journey that strains the small subs and their crews. The Novorossiysk’s limp home was a vivid illustration of these limits.
In the Baltic Sea, Russia’s Baltic Fleet has a more modest undersea component – traditionally a couple of older Kilo-class boats for local defence of the Saint Petersburg approaches. In recent years, there was an expectation that the new Lada-class diesel-electric submarines – Project 677, an advanced design with air-independent propulsion – would be deployed to the Baltic Fleet. The first of class, St. Petersburg, has been in trial status for years, and a second unit, Kronstadt, was finally delivered in 2024. These could eventually bolster the Baltic Fleet’s capabilities. However, with the Baltic Sea effectively a NATO lake after Finland’s accession to the alliance, any Russian subs there would operate under extremely constrained conditions in wartime. The Baltic Fleet’s submarines have thus played a lesser role in Russia’s power projection, mostly staying near home waters. By contrast, the adjoining Northern Fleet’s subs can slip under the Arctic ice or out into the North Atlantic. Russia also maintains a fleet of special-purpose submarines operated by the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research (GUGI). These include some very unique vessels, such as the AS-12/Losharik, a nuclear-powered mini-submarine capable of ultra-deep dives, over 6,000 meters, for seabed operations. Losharik tragically suffered a fatal fire in 2019 that killed 14 naval officers onboard, but Moscow has indicated it will repair and return this sub to service. Another is the Podmoskovye (BS-64), a modified Delta IV-class sub that serves as a “mothership” for smaller submersibles. As mentioned, the Belgorod also falls into this category – carrying both Poseidons and midget subs. The mission of these secretive platforms is to enable seabed warfare and strategic sabotage, such as tapping or cutting undersea communication cables, mapping the ocean floor for sensors, and potentially deploying nuclear-powered devices on the seabed. Western officials have raised alarms about unusual Russian undersea activity near critical infrastructure in recent years; for instance, the sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipelines in 2022 led to widespread, if unconfirmed, suspicion of Russian involvement. In response, NATO and partner nations have enhanced surveillance of undersea domains. In early 2025, the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force even activated a special response, dubbed NORDIC WARDEN, to address Russian threats to undersea cables in the North Atlantic and North Sea. Clearly, Russia’s Shadow fleet of special subs is viewed as a serious risk to Western economic and military infrastructure. This sub-flotilla, though small, adds another asymmetric dimension to Russia’s naval power – one that plays to its strengths in stealth and nuclear engineering, and exploits Western vulnerabilities under the ocean waves.
A Navy Not to be Underestimated
Russia’s submarine force today presents a mix of ageing vulnerabilities and cutting-edge threats. On one hand, incidents like the Novorossiysk breakdown highlight that many of Russia’s subs, especially diesel-electric boats, suffer from reliability issues, sparse maintenance, and the strain of war. Years of budget constraints and sanctions, which complicate obtaining high-tech components, have led to maintenance backlogs – for example, several Black Sea and Baltic Fleet Kilo-class subs have been idled at times waiting for overhauls. The full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 also shifted Russia’s naval priorities, with the Black Sea Fleet losing several vessels, and at least one submarine, to Ukrainian attacks, and being largely bottled up close to home. Moreover, Western navies have proven they can track and contain Russian subs in some scenarios; British and NATO forces, using anti-submarine warfare (ASW) assets like patrol aircraft and sonar arrays, have detected Russian subs in the North Sea and North Atlantic on various occasions, forcing them to return to safer waters. The Mediterranean deployment of Russia’s subs – which at its peak saw multiple boats operating out of Syria – has dwindled to almost nothing since 2024, demonstrating how geopolitical setbacks, like losing the Tartus base and Turkey closing access, can sharply curtail Russia’s reach. These factors could tempt observers to dismiss the Russian undersea threat as overhyped, exemplified by Rutte’s tongue-in-cheek remark about a “broken” submarine being the extent of Russia’s presence.
On the other hand, military experts warn that it would be “only a fool” who underestimates Russia’s naval threat based on one limping sub. The capabilities that Russia’s best submarines possess are very real and dangerous. A diesel Kilo may falter, but a nuclear Yasen-class on the prowl is a different challenge altogether. As Benedict Baxendale-Smith, a researcher at the Defence Studies Department of King’s College London, noted in his analysis for an article for the Council on Geostrategy, suspected technical problems on a few units “are not emblematic of a navy’s ability to wage war” – after all, even NATO navies occasionally have failures, yet their deterrent patrols remain effective. Similarly, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet performance against Ukraine, where its ships have suffered drone and missile strikes, should not be extrapolated to how its Northern Fleet would fare in the open ocean. In the North Atlantic and Arctic, Russia still commands a credible and capable threat. Its modern submarines can launch long-range precision strikes with Kalibr missiles without ever leaving their bastion waters. In fact, with the advent of Kalibr, and now possibly Zircon, on most Russian subs and even many surface ships, the Russian Navy can hit European targets from within its own nearby seas. This fundamentally challenges NATO’s old assumption that Russia must “break out” through the GIUK gap to threaten the Atlantic seaboard.
As John Foreman, a former Royal Navy officer, observed for Britain’s World, “the Russian Navy can now strike British military and civilian targets from within its own fleet operating areas”, forcing NATO to expand its defence focus beyond just stopping Russian subs in the open ocean. In essence, Russia is leveraging the concept of “sea denial”: rather than seeking to dominate the high seas, it has built a force that can make certain zones – the Arctic, Baltic, Black Sea, and Far East littorals – extremely hazardous for adversaries, while still reaching out with missiles – or Poseidon drones in the future – to inflict serious damage from those zones. Putin himself has defined the Arctic Ocean, the Black Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk, and others as “vital and strategic waters” for Russia, and that focus is evident in Russia’s procurement. The Navy is increasingly defensive in posture – a “mosquito fleet” and undersea bastion force designed to defend Russia’s approaches, deny NATO navies access, and serve as a nuclear and conventional deterrent.
Meanwhile, Russia continues to innovate in the undersea domain in ways that worry Western planners. The Poseidon nuclear torpedo is one example, essentially bypassing traditional missile defences by delivering a warhead via the ocean depths. Another example is Russia’s experiments with nuclear-powered cruise missiles, the Burevestnik, and the development of new ultra-quiet diesel subs, like the future Kalina-class with air-independent propulsion, to patrol its littoral waters. In addition, Russia’s subs are expected to play a role in any future great-power conflict by threatening transatlantic sea lines – not necessarily through pitched battles on the high seas, but by forcing NATO to divert enormous resources to ASW efforts. For instance, when a single Russian Yasen was believed to be in the Atlantic in 2020, the US Navy reportedly surged multiple patrol aircraft and at least one ASTUTE-class British submarine to monitor it, illustrating how even one modern Russian sub ties down significant NATO assets. Undersea cables and energy pipelines crisscrossing the North Atlantic and North Sea are also vulnerable – a fact not lost on Moscow. NATO has responded by creating a new Atlantic Command and deploying additional sensors, but the vastness of the underwater domain makes complete security impossible.
NATO Navies Will be Challenged
The Russian submarine fleet of today is a study in contrasts. It is no longer the massed Soviet armada of the 1980s, but what it lacks in numbers or reliability, it is trying to make up in novelty and lethality – from doomsday torpedoes to highly capable cruise missile subs. Some of its boats are ageing and even “limping” in plain sight, yet others are slinking unseen through the depths, keeping NATO admirals awake at night. As Russia launches new submarines like the Khabarovsk and invests billions into its undersea forces, NATO navies will be challenged to track and counter them, especially in the High North. Western officials may indulge in the occasional joke at Russia’s expense, but they also acknowledge the threat is serious. “So, while a ‘limping’ Russian submarine may prove worthy of ridicule, it should not form the basis of strategic complacency,” Benedict Baxendale-Smith warned in a Council on Geostrategy analysis article. In the cold calculus of naval power, Russia’s submarines – old and new alike – remain the sharpest spearhead of its military, and perhaps the most consequential undersea threat facing NATO in the years ahead.
Read More:
- The Barents Observer: Here comes Russia’s first serial submarine to carry nuclear-powered giga-torpedoes
- Press Trust of India (via Business Standard): Russia launches new nuclear submarine carrier of ‘doomsday missile’
- Naval News: Russia’s Submarine Problem Is Much Worse Than Many Imagine
- The Kyiv Independent: NATO chief mocks Russia over malfunctioning submarine ‘limping home from patrol’
- Britain’s World: Is the Russian Navy a capable threat to Britain
- The Barents Observer: 20 years after Kursk, Russia moves from tragedy to redefined underwater warfare capability
- NTI: Russia Submarine Capabilities
- The Barents Observer: Russian subs to sail more under Arctic sea-ice
- Royal Navy: Royal Navy tracks Russian submarine in UK waters
- Royal Navy: Royal Navy joins NATO in historic operation tracking Russian activity in UK waters
- APT (YouTube): Russia Unveils ‘Khabarovsk’: The Submarine Built to Launch Nuclear Poseidon Drones
- WION: Khabarovsk Submarine Unveiled: Russia’s New Carrier of Poseidon Nuclear Drone
- WION: Russia Launches Khabarovsk Submarine with Poseidon ‘Doomsday’ Drone | New Nuclear Threat Unveiled
- Wikipedia: List of Soviet and Russian submarine classes
